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Non technical summary 
The global financial crisis has brought a rather unprecedented period of expansion of 
banks’ international financial assets and liabilities to an end. In response to the crisis, 
banks have decreased their international activities as, due to regulatory restrictions, they 
had to shrink their balance sheets. While total international assets of German banks 
grew, on average, by 8% per year between 2002 and 2007, international assets dropped 
by almost 20% in 2008 alone. These adjustments have taken place due to changing risk 
perceptions, changing regulations, and changes in the sensitivity towards financial 
frictions. The key question is whether this withdrawal of banks from foreign markets 
will be short-lived or whether it marks the beginning of a sustained period of financial 
disintegration, as was observed after the Great Depression. 
In this paper, we study bank internationalization before and during the crisis from a 
bank-level perspective. Our data give detailed information on the internationalization of 
German banks. The “External Position Reports” provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank 
contain very detailed information on the international assets of German banks and their 
foreign affiliates. We use this information on a yearly and country-by-country basis. 
Our sample starts in December 2002, when minimum reporting thresholds were 
abolished, and ends in December 2011. We investigate the determinants of the stocks of 
banks’ assets at the end of each year. 
Stylized facts show that the decline in international banking in response to the crisis is 
most pronounced in terms of the volume of international activities (the intensive 
margin), but we also find a decline in the number of foreign subsidiaries (the extensive 
margin). However, this decline started well before the crisis and has hardly accelerated 
since then. 
Our results from running so called gravity equations suggest the following interpretation 
of these trends and their persistence: 
First, banks with market-based funding models have higher international assets. Hence, 
persistently tighter conditions on funding markets would have an impact on the 
internationalization strategies that banks will pursue in the future. How persistent this 
adjustment is going to be is hard to predict. To the extent that the reregulation of the 
banking industry that is currently taking place changes market structures in banking and 
banks’ funding markets, the adjustment is likely to be persistent. 
Second, policy interventions matter. Some German banks which received state support 
during the crisis have lowered their international assets, and foreign macroprudential 
  
policies had a negative impact as well. To the extent that reductions in international 
assets are associated with the closure of foreign affiliates, they are likely to be 
persistent. 
Third, financial frictions, proxied by gravity-type variables like distance, common 
language, etc., matter for international banking. However, their impact has remained 
relatively stable throughout the crisis. The variables for which we find a stronger effect 
during the crisis period are adjacency and the presence of bilateral trade agreements. 
This suggests that trade-related finance has become relatively more important over time.  
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Abstract 
The global financial crisis has brought to an end a rather unprecedented period of banks’ 
international expansion. We analyze the effects of the crisis on international banking. Using a 
detailed dataset on the international assets of all German banks with foreign affiliates for the 
years 2002-2011, we study bank internationalization before and during the crisis. Our data allow 
analyzing not only the international assets of the banks’ headquarters but also of their foreign 
affiliates. We show that banks have lowered their international assets, both along the extensive 
and the intensive margin. This withdrawal from foreign markets is the result of changing market 
conditions, of policy interventions, and of a weakly increasing sensitivity of banks to financial 
frictions.  
Keywords: International banking, gravity model, financial frictions 
JEL-Classification: G01, F34, G21  
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1 Motivation 
The global financial crisis has brought a rather unprecedented period of expansion of 
banks’ international financial assets and liabilities to an end. In response to the crisis, 
banks have lowered their international assets and liabilities in the process of 
deleveraging and shrinking their balance sheets. While total international assets of 
German banks grew, on average, by 8% per year between 2002 and 2007, international 
assets dropped by almost 20% in 2008 alone. These adjustments have taken place due to 
changing risk perceptions, changing regulations, and changes in financial frictions. The 
key question is whether this withdrawal of banks from foreign markets will be short-
lived or whether it marks the beginning of a sustained period of financial disintegration, 
as was observed after the Great Depression (Rajan and Zingales 2003).  
In this paper, we study bank internationalization before and during the crisis from a 
bank-level perspective. Our data give detailed information on the internationalization of 
German banks. The “External Position Reports” provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank 
contain information on the international assets of German banks and their foreign 
affiliates (branches and subsidiaries), month-by-month and country-by-country. Our 
sample starts in December 2002, when minimum reporting thresholds were abolished, 
and ends in December 2011. We investigate the determinants of the stocks of banks’ 
assets at the end of each year. 
Data similar to ours have been used in previous work to analyze the importance of bank 
productivity for the international activities of banks (Buch et al. 2012, 2011b), the 
determinants of short-term adjustments of internationally active banks during the crisis 
(Düwel et al. 2011), the portfolio investment decisions of German banks in emerging 
markets (Wildmann 2011), the impact of international activities of German banks on 
performance at home (Buch et al. 2013), or the impact of crisis-related policy measures 
on international banking (Buch et al. 2011a). Düwel et al. (2011) find that rising risk 
aversion, measured through the capital-asset ratio of a German parent bank, has a 
negative impact on cross-border lending activities of the corporate banking group, even 
more so during the crisis. Düwel (2013) analyzes the adjustment of international banks 
through the internal capital market. 
In contrast to this research, we explicitly distinguish between three modes of 
international banking activities: direct activities by the German bank holding companies 
in different destination countries and indirect activities via branches and subsidiaries 
located abroad (in what we call host countries) to different destination countries. Hence, 
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we distinguish the direct mode from the branch mode, and the subsidiary mode (Figure 
1). Assets held through either of these modes are labeled “international assets” of banks. 
Thus, we can exploit a richer geographical structure of the data compared to previous 
work: Instead of analyzing the activities of domestic banks in certain foreign destination 
countries only, we also analyze international activities of German banks’ foreign 
affiliates. In fact, a little more than half of our observations are related to such “export-
platform” FDI, i.e. to activities of German banks’ foreign affiliates outside the market in 
which these affiliates reside.  
We find that the decline in international banking in response to the crisis is most 
pronounced in terms of the volume of international activities and thus for the intensive 
margin. We also describe adjustment along the extensive margin, and we find a decline 
in the number of foreign subsidiaries. However, this decline started well before the 
crisis and has hardly accelerated since then. In terms of the composition of foreign 
activities, we observe a shift away from assets held through subsidiaries towards assets 
held through branches.  
Overall, our findings suggest three explanations for the decline in international banking. 
First, banks have responded to changing funding conditions. During the crisis, banks 
had to economize on their use of capital. This could explain why banks have reduced 
the share of international assets held through the subsidiary mode, which is the most 
expensive way of entering foreign markets. Also, wholesale and short-term funding 
have become more costly during the crisis, thus affecting in particular those banks with 
a market-based funding model. However, the sensitivity of banks’ international 
activities to bank-specific variables measuring the funding structure has not changed 
much during the crisis. 
Second, government support during the crisis has been conditional on the requirement 
that banks close some of their foreign affiliates (EU 2009, Zimmer and Blaschczok 
2012). In our empirical results, we show that banks which have received state support 
during the crisis from the German federal government or from state governments have 
indeed reduced their international assets. 
Third, the withdrawal from foreign countries could reflect an increasing home bias in 
banks’ activities, as has been documented in other work analyzing the response of banks 
to the crisis (Giannetti and Laeven 2011, Hildebrand et al. 2012, Rose and Wieladek 
2011). Note that the reasons are difficult to disentangle: If withdrawal is due to 
increased risks and/or lower (relative) returns, it may in fact be a rational response to 
market conditions rather than an increased bias in investment decisions. Generally, we 
find a significant effect of financial frictions on the international activities of German 
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banks: Adjacency, common language, common legal origins, and regional trade 
agreements have a positive impact on international assets; distance has a negative 
impact. In the international trade literature, the distance coefficient is interpreted as a 
proxy for transportation costs. In international banking, physical transportation costs are 
of limited importance. Here, the geographic distance between two countries is a proxy 
for informational frictions or monitoring costs (Brüggemann et al. 2012, Okawa and van 
Wincoop 2012). Perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, the effects of most of these 
financial frictions have remained rather unchanged during the crisis. If anything, the 
effects of adjacency and of regional trade agreements being in place have become more 
important.  
Our research complements previous work analyzing the transmission of shocks across 
borders and the impact of the crisis on banks’ investments at home. A first set of papers 
looks at the impact of government interventions. Rose and Wieladek (2011) use 
information on local lending by foreign banks residing in the UK to analyze how 
support measures, such as capital injections targeted at these banks, have affected 
lending in the UK. After nationalization, foreign banks reduced the share of their loans 
going to the UK, which can be interpreted as evidence for financial protectionism. 
Giannetti and Laeven (2011) analyze the geographic structure of syndicated loan 
issuances and find a “flight home” effect in response to the crisis. The strength of this 
effect is not affected by government intervention, measured by a dummy variable that 
equals one if a bank was nationalized or received state support in the form of asset or 
capital guarantees. Our findings show that state support (capital injections, credit lines, 
and guarantees) had a negative impact on the international activities of banks since 
these aids were given only subject to certain conditions. 
De Haas and Van Horen (2011) use individual loan data from syndicated loan issuances 
for the world’s largest banks. During the crisis, foreign banks have remained more 
committed to countries hosting an affiliated subsidiary, that are geographically close, 
and that have built up relationships with local banks. Our findings confirm the 
importance of geography for international bank assets, indicating a negative and 
strongly significant effect of distance on international lending. Furthermore, we also 
find a positive effect of affiliate lending within host countries.  
Finally, our results are in line with previous studies for German banks documenting an 
impact of the crisis on lending at home and an increasing home bias in banks’ security 
portfolios. Puri et al. (2011) study the impact of the crisis on lending at home. They find 
that savings banks which are linked to Landesbanken affected by the crisis reject 
substantially more loan applications than non-affected banks. Hildebrand et al. (2012) 
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use the Bundesbank's Securities Holdings Statistics to analyze the securities portfolios 
of banks. During the crisis, banks have increased the share of domestic sovereign bonds 
in their portfolios. 
Our research is motivated by recent theoretical work justifying a gravity equation in 
banking, which suggests taking into account variables proxying for information 
asymmetries in gravity equations for international asset holdings as a measure of 
financial frictions. Work by Brüggemann et al. (2012) and Niepmann (2013) provides a 
direct motivation for international bank loans, while most other models focus on 
international equity investments. We also borrow from the empirical analysis presented 
by Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) in the sense that we use a broad measure of 
financial frictions and that we test how their importance has changed over time, across 
countries, and – as a new element – across banks.  
In Part 2, we summarize recent theoretical work motivating the use of gravity equations 
in international banking and finance. In Part 3, we describe our data and our empirical 
methodology. In Part 4, we present the regression results. Part 5 concludes.  
2 Theoretical Background 
Empirical gravity models have a long-standing tradition in the international banking 
literature. The distance between countries, the size of markets, regulatory barriers and 
variables capturing information frictions explain international asset holdings quite well 
(Aviat and Coeurdacier 2007, Berger et al. 2004, Buch 2003, Buch and Lipponer 2007, 
Claessens and van Horen 2012, Focarelli and Pozzolo 2005).2 However, there has been, 
until recently, very little theoretical motivation for why international banking should 
depend on gravity-type variables. Recent theoretical work takes up the issue of 
motivating the use of gravity models in international banking and finance. These models 
differ with regard to the specific financial friction they assume and the type of asset they 
focus on. Yet, the empirical specifications following from this research are similar.  
2.1 Gravity Equations for International Bank Assets 
Brüggemann et al. (2012) provide a theoretical motivation for an empirical gravity 
equation of banks’ international assets. They develop a search model in which a firm g 
located in country i seeks a bank loan with specific characteristics in terms of maturity, 
volume, interest rates, or other contractual features. Search is done across a number of 
possible countries N, including the home country. The firm chooses a bank k in a 
                                                 
2 For an extensive survey of literature on home bias in international asset portfolios, see Coeurdacier and 
Rey (2011). 
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particular country j if this bank offers the most attractive loan conditions. The lowest 
cost at which the bank can supply a loan is given by igjkc . This cost depends on 
observable factors such as geographic distance, which generates monitoring costs ( ij ). 
Banks also differ along other dimensions, hence total costs are composed of the average 
interest rate in a particular country jr , average bank characteristics ja , and a term 
capturing any unobservable cost or bank-firm-specific traits ( igjk ): 
igjkjijjigjk arc   . Any variation in costs across countries can be summarized 
as ijc : igjkijigjk cc  .  
A firm then compares offers of banks located in different countries. The probability that 
a firm chooses a specific bank depends on the average cost structures, on the 
characteristics of the country pair, and on an unobservable cost component. 
Brüggemann et al. (2012) use their model to study aggregate credit relationships 
between banks and firms located in countries i and j as a function of the average interest 
rate in the host country, bilateral observable monitoring costs (geographic distance), the 
number of banks active in the foreign market, and the size of the foreign banking 
market. They also include time-varying measures of multilateral resistance, i.e. country-
year fixed effects for the host and the destination country. The multilateral resistance 
term refers to the average financial barrier of any country vis-à-vis all other countries 
(Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, Baldwin and Taglioni 2006) (see Section 3.3).3 
2.2 Gravity Equations for International Financial Assets 
While the above models focus on international banking, in general it is straightforward 
to derive a gravity equation for international financial asset holdings as well. Martin and 
Rey (2004) model a portfolio choice for international holdings of equity in an 
environment with risk-averse agents, an endogenous number of assets, and costs of 
international transactions. This leads to a theoretical gravity equation in which bilateral 
asset holdings depend on the distance between two countries and the size of their 
markets. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) use a similar theoretical modeling approach. 
They focus on the relationship between bilateral trade and financial linkages, arguing 
                                                 
3 While Brüggeman et al (2012) focus on the role of information cost as a motivation for the gravity 
equation in banking, Niepmann (2013) focuses on relative efficiency. In her model, banks intermediate 
savings between the home and the foreign economy. There are two sources of heterogeneity: Countries 
differ in their factor endowments, and banks differ in their efficiency of intermediation. Efficiency is 
reflected in a fee banks collect for their services. Financial intermediation is subject to a moral hazard 
problem because firms can choose between good and bad projects, this choice being unobservable by the 
banks. In her model, bilateral bank assets between two countries depend on relative capital endowments 
and levels of bank efficiency.  
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that there can be two-way causality. Empirically, they find that accounting for asset 
trade reduces the impact of distance on trade in goods.  
Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) have taken up the role of gravity in international 
finance. Their portfolio model consists of risky assets, which could capture equity assets 
or fixed income securities such as corporate bonds. In addition, there is a risk-free bond. 
Each risky security has a payoff which depends on country-specific as well as global 
factors. The demand for an asset depends on the expected asset return (relative to the 
risk-free asset) and the variance of country-specific returns.  
The main non-standard element is the assumption of an information asymmetry: 
domestic agents have better information about the idiosyncratic risk of the domestic 
securities as compared to foreign investors. As in Brüggemann et al. (2012), there is a 
bilateral cost term ij , but the interpretation is different. In Okawa and van Wincoop 
(2012), this term affects the variance of a particular asset, i.e. 
2
iij  where iiij    when 
ji  . Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) estimate their model using bilateral data on 
equity holdings. They include variables capturing information frictions such as 
geographic distance, bilateral trade links, common language, adjacency, a common legal 
system, regulatory similarity, or currency unions.4  
2.3 Implications for Empirical Work 
The models reviewed above differ in terms of the assets considered, the type of 
informational friction, and the optimization approach. However, there are two important 
parallels.  
The first parallel is that bilateral asset holdings depend not only on bilateral information 
frictions ij  but also on the relative friction jiij DD , where iD  and jD  are the average 
financial frictions in the host and the destination country. These relative frictions can be 
captured by a full set of country-year fixed effects. The importance of dummy variables 
capturing multilateral resistance was first brought up in the international trade literature. 
In gravity regressions country-year dummies capture omitted variables, which are 
correlated with trade costs and with the error term (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006). 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that time-varying country fixed effects 
                                                 
4 Bergin and Pyun (2012) extend a model by Devereux and Sutherland (2011), which allows for an 
endogenous choice of international assets in an open economy macro model, to an N-country setting. 
Their theoretical setup is different from the papers discussed so far because they do not assume frictions 
in asset trade between countries. Instead, their multilateral resistance terms capture third-country 
correlation effects. The authors show that including these terms addresses the “correlation puzzle”, i.e. the 
inability of previous literature to show an impact of return correlations on asset holdings as predicted by 
standard theory. 
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account for multilateral resistance. In their model, multilateral resistance captures 
country-specific price indices: for a given bilateral trade barrier, higher trade barriers 
between j and all its other trade partners will reduce the relative price of country i’s 
exports to j and thereby cause a rise of i’s exports to j. High multilateral resistance of 
one country thus increases bilateral trade of all other countries. Including multilateral 
resistance terms addresses the concern that early empirical applications of the gravity 
equation found implausibly high border effects. In our context, multilateral resistance 
terms capture portfolio effects and the effects of financial frictions in one host market 
relative to all other countries. 
The second parallel across the theoretical papers is the similarity of control variables 
which should be included in an empirical gravity equation. Brüggemann et al. (2012) or 
Niepmann (2013) regress log bank assets between countries i and j on distance, proxies 
for the size and development of foreign banking systems as well as on a full set of host-
country and receiving-country fixed effects. Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) use a 
larger set of measures for informational frictions as well as time-varying destination- 
and host-country fixed effects. They also replace the host country-year dummies by 
explanatory variables at the country level, while including separate country and year 
fixed effects. We proceed similarly in order to check the robustness of our results.  
Our specific empirical model thus looks as follows. We estimate a baseline gravity 
equation which relates the log of bank k’s international assets A in host country i and 
destination country j to fixed effects as well as to bank- and country-pair specific 
explanatory variables: 
  tijtjtikktkM
m
m
tijmtkij dddXzA ,,,1,
1
,, 'ln   

   (1) 
where mtijz ,  is a vector of observable bilateral financial frictions between countries i and j 
including bilateral distance, adjacency, common language, a common legal system, and 
regional trade agreements being in place. m  are coefficient estimates on these 
observables, tkX ,  are explanatory variables at the bank level, and tij ,  is an error term. 
kd  are fixed effects for each parent bank, tid ,  and tjd ,  are time-varying destination and 
source country dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the level of each host-
destination country pair.5 
                                                 
5 We have experimented with different clustering options such as destination country, host country, or 
bank-host country clusters, but the results are hardly affected. 
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As an alternative to our model with country-year fixed effects, Fitzgerald (2012) 
suggests modeling multilateral resistance terms by including price terms for all 
countries. This approach has the advantage that additional variables which vary along 
the country-time dimension can be included. Claessens and van Horen (2012) apply a 
similar empirical model to banking data. They include a measure of competitor 
remoteness by explaining the location decision of banks with a variable measuring the 
weighted distance of all competing banks in a specific host country. They find that 
competitor remoteness has an impact on the locational decision of banks. We do not 
follow the same route here for two reasons. First, we do not have a full set of bilateral 
trade data for all countries in the sample. Second, our main focus is on the effects of 
measures of bilateral financial frictions and their changing importance over time. 
Hence, the specific results for time-varying destination country variables such as GDP 
are of lesser interest for us.  
In terms of the geographic dimension, the structure of our dataset differs from previous 
work in the following sense. Firms and households in any destination country can 
choose between loans granted by German banks, their respective foreign branches and 
subsidiaries, or loans by banks from countries other than Germany. In each market, 
German banks and their foreign affiliates are thus assumed to compete against many 
other domestic and foreign banks. Unobserved third-country characteristics, such as 
changes in the competitive environment, are also captured through the full set of time-
varying host- and destination-country fixed effects. 
3 Data 
This section gives an overview of the data that we use. Data definitions and sources can 
be found in the appendix. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. 
3.1 External Position Reports 
Our main data source are the External Position Reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(Fiorentino et al. 2010). The data can be used for research purposes on the premises of 
the Bundesbank only. The dataset provides a full sample survey of German banks’ 
international activities. The Bundesbank receives mandatory reports on external 
positions by all banks located in Germany and by their foreign affiliates, including 
assets and liabilities vis-à-vis foreign counterparties. These data serve, inter alia, as 
inputs to the bilateral banking statistics provided by the Bank for International 
Settlements. Reporting occurs monthly, and reporting thresholds have been abandoned 
in 2002. We use the data at an annual frequency (2002-2011) because we are interested 
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in the long-run structure of international asset holdings and also because most of our 
explanatory variables are available only at an annual frequency. 
 
Modes of foreign activities 
Our empirical model differs from previous work applying the gravity model to banking 
or financial markets in two regards. First, we use bank-level data, which allow us to 
analyze the importance of individual bank-related factors such as their size, their 
funding structure, as well as the fact that some banks have received state support during 
the crisis. Second, we restrict our analysis to banks which are headquartered in 
Germany. However, we have information not only on the international activities of the 
banks located in Germany, but also on the cross border activities of their foreign 
affiliates located in host countries other than Germany. Hence, we can still exploit the 
bilateral nature of international banking relations, which would not be the case if we 
estimated a model of the consolidated foreign exposure of each bank group. We 
distinguish three different modes of foreign activities (Figure 1): 
Mode 1 captures the assets held in a given foreign country by domestic banks located in 
Germany. We label this the “direct mode”.  
Mode 2 captures assets held in a given destination country by branches located in a 
particular foreign host country. We label this the indirect “branch mode”. 
Mode 3 captures assets held in a given destination country by subsidiaries located in a 
particular foreign host country. We label this the indirect “subsidiary mode”. 
Subsidiaries are legally independent, hold their own equity, are subject to host-country 
control, and frequently run large-scale retail operations. Therefore, they incur the 
highest costs in terms of capital requirements, regulatory (start-up) burden, and fixed 
investments (Cerutti et al. 2007, Fiechter et al. 2011).  
Figure 1 shows the structure of the dataset: Suppose that there is a bank holding 
company Banco Teutonia6 (BHC) in Germany. Banco Teutonia can now engage in 
direct or indirect international asset holdings. Direct asset holdings, or the “direct 
mode”, imply that Banco Teutonia lends money to a firm, a household, a bank or the 
government in country A or in country B. Let us call country A the host country and 
country B the destination country. Banco Teutonia now also has branches and 
subsidiaries in host country A. If assets are held through a branch or a subsidiary, we 
call these indirect international asset holdings. These branches and subsidiaries in the 
                                                 
6 This name is purely fictitious. Any resemblance to real banks, living or dead, is purely coincidental. 
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host country can either lend to firms, households, banks or the government in host 
country A, or they can lend to firms, households, banks or the government in destination 
country B.  
Figure 1:  Modes of International Asset Holdings 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank Holding 
Company (BHC) in 
Germany 
Total assets in destination country  
Total assets  
in host country  
 
 
 
 
 
direct cross-border activity (direct mode) 
indirect cross-border activity (branch mode and subsidiary mode) 
Subsidiary of 
BHC in host 
country  
Branch of 
BHC in host 
country  
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Overall, there are about 1,800 banks active in Germany. Many of these banks are small 
regional cooperative or savings banks without any active international business.7 
Activities of many of these banks remain confined even within small regional domestic 
market segments. International banking is dominated by the largest banks in Germany, 
in particular when it comes to direct investment abroad through foreign affiliates (Buch 
et al. 2012).  
For this reason, we include all banks with foreign affiliates in our dataset, which is an 
unbalanced panel with information on (the largest) 100 bank holding companies plus 
almost all remaining bank holding companies (54), which are not among the largest 100 
banks, but which have foreign branches or subsidiaries. Overall, the number of banks in 
our sample has declined from 154 to 123 over the sample period (2002-2011). Because 
we do not observe all of these bank holding companies at each point in time, we restrict 
our panel to those 92 bank holding companies (34 commercial banks, 45 savings banks, 
and 13 cooperative banks) that appear throughout the entire dataset. This means that we 
are left with a “balanced” panel, when it comes to bank holding companies and years. 
Of course, these bank holding companies are not present in all markets through all 
modes. Thus, the dataset is not entirely balanced along the foreign dimension. The 
banks reside in up to 68 host countries and are active in 79 destination countries. Our 
data cover 70-78% of all direct international activity by the bank holding companies, as 
well as 88-100% of all foreign subsidiaries, and 84-92% of all foreign branches of 
German banks (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
7 Our dataset includes all large cooperative and savings banks as well as their head institutions (including 
Landesbanken). These, of course, are active abroad to a considerable extent. 
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Figure 2:  Number of Bank Holding Companies, Branches, and Subsidiaries 
The graphs report the absolute number of bank holding companies active in non-German destination 
countries via subsidiaries and branches as well as the absolute number of subsidiaries and branches via 
which these bank holding companies are active abroad.  
(a) Bank Holding Companies with Foreign Subsidiaries 
 
 
(b) Number of Foreign Subsidiaries 
 
 
(c) Bank Holdings Companies Active via Branches 
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(d) Number of Foreign Branches 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the External Positions Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
 
3.1.1 Extensive Margin 
We are interested not only in the volume of international activities (the intensive 
margin) but also in the number of banks that are active abroad (the extensive margin). If 
banks withdraw from foreign markets, i.e. if they adjust along the extensive margin, 
adjustment is likely to be more persistent than in a situation in which they lower the 
volume of international assets only. Our analysis of the extensive margin is purely 
descriptive. Analyzing the extensive margin in a regression-based model is difficult 
given the nature of our dataset. In order to provide results comparable to those of the 
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intensive margin, we would need a dataset which spans options for all banks and all 
foreign affiliates to invest into all foreign markets.  
Figure 2 shows the total number of bank holding companies active abroad via 
subsidiaries and branches. In the year 2011, there have been fewer bank holding 
companies with subsidiaries (35) than at the beginning of the sample period (47 in 
2002). In terms of the number of subsidiaries, there has been quite a remarkable decline 
from 200 to 87 over the reporting period. The total number of banks active through the 
branch mode has been more stable (around 54). The total number of branches has 
increased from 205 in the year 2002 to 226 in the year 2008. In immediate response to 
the crisis, 16 branches have been closed.  
The bank holding companies in our dataset had on average 1.9 subsidiaries in 2002 and 
0.9 subsidiaries in 2011, where the average number of subsidiaries declined steadily in 
between.  When only looking at the average of those BHCs that actually have at least 
one subsidiary, they had 5.3 subsidiaries on average in 2002 and 2.5 subsidiaries in 
2011. As concerns branches, the bank holding companies in our dataset had on average 
1.9 in 2002, 2.2 branches in 2008, and 2 branches in 2011. The number of branches rose 
up to 2008 and declined again thereafter. When only looking at the average of those 
BHCs that actually have at least one branch, they had 4.6 branches on average in 2002, 
5.3 branches in 2008 and 4.7 branches in 2011. 
3.1.2 Intensive Margin 
Our data cover a time period which is characterized by two distinct trends in 
international banking. Prior to the crisis, banks have increased their exposure vis-à-vis 
foreign markets to a significant extent. This expansion of international activities 
reflects, both, enhanced financial market integration and the buildup of excessive credit 
on banks’ balance sheets. After the start of the financial crisis in August 2007 and, at an 
accelerated path, after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, banks have 
withdrawn from foreign markets (Figures 3a and b).8 
  
                                                 
8 The share of international assets in Figure 3a is calculated as the amount of total international assets of 
the bank holding company and all subsidiaries and branches relative to the balance sheet total of the bank 
holding company.  Since subsidiary assets are not part of the bank holding company’s balance sheet, 
shares can exceed 100%.  
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Figure 3:  Foreign Activity of German Banks by Mode 
Graph (a) reports aggregated total international assets of the entire banking groups in % of the balance 
sheet total of the German bank holding companies for all banks as well as for the different groups of 
banks (commercial, savings, cooperative). 
Graph (b) reports the absolute amount of total international assets of bank holding companies (residing in 
Germany, i.e. direct international activity) as well as their branches and subsidiaries (not residing in 
Germany) in millions of €.  
Graph (c) reports the relative shares in total international assets attributable to the different modes of 
foreign activity (i.e. direct international activity by the bank holding company, via foreign branches, or 
via foreign subsidiaries). 
 (a) International Assets in % of Total Assets by Banking Group 
 
 
(b) International Assets in Million € 
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(c) International Assets by Mode in % of Total International Assets 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the External Positions Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
 
Banks have not only shifted their activities across regions, but there has also been a shift 
in the composition of international activities across modes. While international assets 
held through the direct mode had increased from below 50% of total international assets 
in 2002 to more than 60% in 2009, they stood at 50% in 2011 (Figure 3c). The overall 
importance of subsidiaries has declined from 17-20% at the beginning of the sample 
until 2006 to only 10-12% between 2007 and 2011. Branch activity fluctuated between 
27 and 40% over the sample period, where it decreased during the crisis, but has been 
increasing again since 2010.  
3.1.3 Summing up 
Our data show five stylized facts: First, more German banks are active abroad via 
branches than via subsidiaries. Second, the number of subsidiaries has declined, but this 
decline has accelerated only marginally over the course of the crisis. Third, the number 
of foreign branches had increased before the crisis, and it has returned to the pre-crisis 
level subsequently. Fourth, the amount of international assets of large German banks 
increased steadily up until 2008 and dropped rapidly thereafter. Fifth, commercial banks 
started to lower their international assets already prior to the crisis; cooperative and 
savings banks increased their foreign exposures until 2007 and only started withdrawing 
from abroad in 2008. 
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3.2 Proxies for Financial Frictions 
One aim of our paper is to assess whether financial frictions have become more 
important during the financial crisis. Financial frictions are not directly observable, and 
we thus refer to proxies that have been used in the literature. These include the log 
distance between the host and destination country, dummies for adjacency, a common 
legal origin, a common language, a common membership in a regional trade 
agreement, and a dummy for countries that share the Euro as their common currency. In 
all models, we include dummies for countries hosting financial centers (Great Britain9, 
Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore, Switzerland) and a dummy for the 
financial crisis (i.e. a variable that takes on the value of one after the period following 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008).10 
It could be argued that there is little variation in, say, the language dummy because we 
consider German banks only. Therefore, the common language dummy might capture 
asset holdings in Austria and Switzerland only. Note that our data include information 
not only on asset holdings of German parents, but also of assets held via subsidiaries or 
branches in different host and destination countries. This adds additional variation to 
these dummy variables. More than 50% of our observations cover these indirect 
relations. Hence, there is sufficient variation in the data to identify the effects of these 
dummies. 
In Column 5 of Table 3, we also include one specification with information on bilateral 
trade. Note that these data are not available for all country-pairs in the sample. 
Therefore, the total number of observations declines from about 59,000 to 49,000. 
Trade has the expected positive sign, being significant at the 10%-level. Because the 
remaining results are not affected much, we leave out this variable in all subsequent 
regressions in order to work with the full sample. 
The above proxies for financial frictions and other transaction costs are country-pair-
specific. To check the robustness of our results, we also include variables that vary 
across countries. Indicators of financial and business freedom from the Heritage 
Foundation measure the degree of economic and financial development, including 
potential unilateral informational frictions. Furthermore, we include host countries’ 
GDP per capita (from the World Bank) to control for the level of economic 
development.  
                                                 
9  Great Britain is treated as a financial center because the data do not allow discriminating between the 
United Kingdom and the Channel Islands Jersey, Guernsey and Isle of Man, which are all considered to 
be financial centers. Also, this dummy captures the role of the City of London as a financial center.  
10  Alternatively, we use a financial crisis dummy that equals one for the period following August 2007. 
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3.3 Bank-Level Controls 
The intensity and the mode through which banks are active abroad are affected strongly 
by bank-specific traits. We control for characteristics of the German bank holding 
company by including log size (total assets), the degree of capitalization (the ratio of 
capital to total, non risk-weighted assets), the dependence on wholesale funding 
(liabilities vis-à-vis banks / total liabilities), and the share of short-term funding (short-
term liabilities / total liabilities). The source for this information are the “Monthly 
Balance Sheet Statistics“ provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Bank-level controls 
are lagged by one year to account for simultaneity issues. 
We also include a dummy variable which equals one for those banks that have received 
state support from the German government. Several German banks, including IKB and 
Landesbanken like WestLB, BayernLB, and SachsenLB, have received capital 
injections, credit lines, and guarantees by the German government (federal and state-
level) between August 2007 and August 2008. In October 2008, the German 
government announced a blank guarantee for bank deposits and it set up a € 400 billion 
bank guarantee fund and a € 70 billion recapitalization facility. The government created 
a special institution to administer these funds, the so-called SoFFin (Sonderfonds 
Finanzmarktstabilisierung, Special Fund Financial Market Stabilization). As of August 
2010, a total of € 152.6 billion in guarantees by the SoFFin has been taken up by eight 
German banks in addition to € 29.3 billion in equity stakes in four German banks 
(Aareal Bank, Commerzbank, Hypo Real Estate, WestLB).  Additionally, capital 
support has been provided by the federal states to their Landesbanken (BayernLB, HSH 
Nordbank). This information has been made publicly available on the SoFFin’s website 
(see also Table 1). 
To capture the effects of these state support measures, we use a combined indicator 
which assumes the value of one from the time when the German parent has received 
some kind of support measure. A reason for using a combined indicator rather than 
treating capital injections and guarantees separately is that most banks have received 
different rescue measures. While the timing of these measures has differed to some 
extent, there is insufficient variation in the data to clearly identify the effects of capital 
injections or guarantees. Overall, 10 out of our over 92 parent banks have received 
government support in one form or another. The expected effect of the state support 
measures is negative because state support has been linked to requirements to close 
foreign affiliates. 
In terms of the bank-level variables, the expected sign for bank size is straightforward, 
International asset holdings involve fixed and variable costs. Larger and thus 
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presumably more productive banks should be able to shoulder these costs more easily. 
The expected effects on the funding variables are not clear cut a priori. Ceteris paribus, 
weakly capitalized banks, banks with a high share of wholesale funding, and banks with 
a high share of short-term funding are more risky. This could induce the banks to be less 
active internationally; hence the expected sign would be positive for capitalization and 
negative for the two funding variables. At the same time, internationalization may be 
seen as a channel for risk diversification and for access to market-based funding. If this 
aspect dominates the decisions of banks to expand internationally, we would expect to 
see a negative effect of capitalization and positive effects of wholesale and short-term 
funding. 
Bank-level controls are potentially endogenous. Because we lack convincing 
instruments for the bank-level variables, we present results including and excluding 
bank-level variables to check the sensitivity of our results. Our main interest lies in the 
country-level proxies for financial frictions. We will show below that our results are 
fairly robust to including or excluding the bank-level variables. Therefore, endogeneity 
of bank-level controls does not affect our results regarding the impact of financial 
frictions to any important degree. 
3.4 Country-Level Controls 
In our baseline specification, we include country-year fixed effects in order to capture 
multilateral resistance (Section 2.3). Hence, we cannot include country-level variables 
such as GDP or trade, which vary across countries and years at the same time.  
Nevertheless, we test whether regulatory policies have affected the international 
activities of banks. The IMF (2011) shows that macroprudential policies affect the 
cyclicality of bank lending. One channel through which these policies affect domestic 
lending could be their impact on the international activities of banks. Hence, we include 
dummy variables capturing regulatory indicators, which have kindly been provided as 
summary statistics by the IMF from a survey among central banks. These regulatory 
measures can be divided into three groups: asset measures, asset/liability measures, and 
capital measures. These indicators are converted into indicator variables ranging from 0-
5 for the asset measures and from 0-3 for the asset/liability measures or for the capital 
measures. The dummies for the individual measures are switched on for the countries 
and years in which the respective measures have been in place. Sample size shrinks 
somewhat to 57 host and 77 destination countries if we add these variables at the 
country level. Hence, we use these variables as robustness tests only (Table 8). 
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4 Estimation Results 
This section analyzes the determinants of banks’ international assets and possible 
changes in these determinants over time. We begin with a set of baseline regressions 
(Table 3). Furthermore, we perform the following robustness tests: We test whether the 
determinants of banks’ international assets have changed significantly over time by 
introducing interaction terms between all explanatory variables and crisis dummies 
(Table 4) as well as by estimating our model for pre- and post-crisis sample splits 
(Table 5). We distinguish the determinants of the intensive margin by mode of foreign 
activity (direct, subsidiary, branch) (Table 6), for the three pillars of the German 
banking system (Table 7), and we examine the effects of specific host-country 
characteristics and banking regulation (Table 8). 
4.1 What Determines the Volume of Banks’ International Assets?  
In Table 3, we analyze the volume of international assets of banks. Our full sample has 
almost 60,000 bank-country-year observations. All regressions include a full set of 
country-year effects; the exception is Column (4), which includes separate host country, 
destination country, and year fixed effects to check for the sensitivity of all other results 
with respect to the level of fixed effects. Results are extremely robust. Additionally, we 
include fixed effects for each bank holding company in all regressions presented in this 
paper. We vary the empirical model with regard to the set of regressors included. Most 
of the variation in the data is driven by the overall cross-section of bank holding 
company-affiliate-destination combinations: while the overall R² is 0.50, the within R² 
takes a value of only 0.07.   
In terms of bank-level explanatory variables, two results are in line with expectations 
and with previous literature: larger banks and banks with a higher share of wholesale 
funding hold higher international assets. Quantitatively, a rise of one percentage point in 
the share of wholesale funding is associated with a one percent increase in total 
international assets in a particular destination country. Hence, the strains that the crisis 
has induced for the wholesale funding market are causes for the decline in banks’ 
international assets during the crisis. Capitalization and short-term funding do not 
impact international assets though. It is thus difficult to draw a straight line from the 
riskiness of banks’ funding models to their internationalization. State support has the 
expected negative effect on international assets: banks which received state support 
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during the crisis hold approximately exp(-0.13)-1= -12.19%11 lower international assets 
than those that did not have to be supported.  
With regard to the proxies for financial frictions, we obtain the expected result: A one 
percent increase in distance lowers international assets by a little more than half a 
percent; sharing a common border or a common language increases foreign asset 
holdings by 95 or 59 percent, respectively; so does membership in a regional trade 
agreement (73 percent). A dummy for international assets held in the Euro Area is 
insignificant in all specifications which include country-year fixed effects.  
Acknowledging the special nature of our dataset, we also include a set of dummies 
capturing the mode through which banks hold their international assets (host is the same 
as destination, host or destination are financial centers). All these dummies are positive 
and significant. This can be interpreted as evidence that lower information costs or 
lower regulatory barriers increase the volume of international bank activity. The results 
for financial frictions do not change qualitatively or in terms of significance when the 
bank-level variables are excluded. This is important because it shows that the potential 
endogeneity of bank-level variables does not affect our main results. 
How important are the different explanatory variables? We answer this question by 
looking at the χ²-value for different sets of variables. These values indicate how much a 
particular set of variables contributes to the explanatory power of the overall model. The 
higher the χ²-value the higher the probability that the variables in question are jointly 
significant.  
In the baseline regression of Table 3 Column (1), financial frictions are the most 
important set of variables. The χ²(7)-value for the bank-specific variables is equal to 
165.7. The null hypothesis that all seven bank-specific variables are equal to zero can be 
rejected at conventional levels of significance. The null hypothesis of the financial 
frictions being all zero can be rejected with a χ²(6)-value of 187.8 as well. The other 
dummy variables (host is destination, host and destination are financial centers) seem to 
be the least important ones with a χ²(3)-value of only 89.3, but they are significant at the 
one percent level, too. 
In addition, we have calculated standardized beta-coefficients (unreported) in order to 
assess the magnitude of the different variables with respect to the overall model.12 In the 
                                                 
11 This formula to calculate the change in international assets will be applied to all coefficients on dummy 
variables throughout the rest of the paper. 
12 Beta coefficients are given by the coefficient estimate of a particular variable, multiplied by the 
standard deviation of this variable, and divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
Hence, beta coefficients give the contribution of each explanatory variable to the variance of the banks’ 
international assets. 
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baseline model in Table 3 Column (1), the most important variables are distance, size, 
and the dummies for financial centers and local lending in the host country. 
4.2 Have the Determinants of Banks’ International Assets Changed 
During the Crisis? 
Given the reversal of banks’ international assets during the crisis as documented in 
Figures 2 and 3, the natural question to ask is whether this has been due to a change in 
the determinants of banks’ foreign activities or due to a changing sensitivity of banks 
with regard to these determinants. This question can be answered by either splitting the 
sample to estimate the model for the pre-crisis and for the crisis period or by including 
interaction terms between all variables and a crisis dummy. Both methods require 
defining a crisis and a pre-crisis period. We perform two splits, using the periods 2002-
2007 or 2002-2008 as the pre-crisis periods, and the subsequent years (2008-2011 or 
2009-2011) as the crisis years. The main results are not affected by this choice. 
Table 4 reports the results including interaction terms between crisis dummies and all 
explanatory variables. It shows that the impact of bank-level controls and most of the 
proxies for financial frictions has not changed over the course of the crisis with two 
exceptions. For the case of the financial crisis dummy being one after the Lehman 
collapse (i.e. starting in 2008), adjacency has become more important and common 
language has become less important. 
Table 5 shows the results splitting the sample into pre-crisis and crisis period. In terms 
of the bank-level variables, it shows that the positive effect of size significantly 
increased during the crisis and that capitalization changed from being negatively 
significant before the crisis to being a positive and significant determinant of 
international assets during the crisis. In terms of the financial frictions, the effect of 
distance, common legal origin, and common language did not change over time. As the 
model with interaction terms, the data are thus not supporting the conventional wisdom 
that banks have become more sensitive to financial frictions or to cultural factors during 
the crisis.  
The sample splits detect three changes in the country-level determinants of banks’ 
international assets, though: the importance of adjacency, of bilateral trade agreements, 
and of the Euro Area dummy has become stronger over time. One interpretation is that 
banks have re-focused their international assets on trade-related activities during the 
crisis. The positive effect of the Euro Area dummy for the crisis-period could reflect a 
general home bias effect or increasing sensitivity to exchange rate risk. 
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Generally, a comparison between the two methods reveals that simply including 
interaction terms for the crisis period fails to detect changes in the determinants of 
cross-border banking that have evolved over the years. Most importantly, the growing 
importance of regional trade agreements is not detected by the interaction terms. 
However, both methods detect a growing importance of adjacency, pointing into the 
direction of an increasing concentration on familiar markets during the crisis. 
4.3 What is the Impact of the Mode of Foreign Banking? 
So far, we have pooled the data across the different modes and we have not 
distinguished differences in foreign business models. Given that foreign branches and 
subsidiaries differ in terms of their costs and in terms of their business model, the 
natural question to ask is whether our main results hold when splitting the sample into 
different modes. Table 6 thus shows the baseline model from Table 3 for all three 
modes of activities separately.  
Many results are qualitatively similar across the different modes, which justifies our 
pooling assumption. For the bank-level variables at the level of the bank holding 
company, results are similar with some exceptions: capitalization has a negative impact 
on branch activity but no impact on all other modes. Size plays a role only for the direct 
mode, and short-term funding impacts only the two indirect modes negatively.  
Financial frictions are somewhat less important for subsidiaries than for the branch or 
the direct mode. One might think that retail-focused subsidiary activity is more 
information sensitive than wholesale oriented direct and branch activity. However, the 
lower information sensitivity might result from the fact that subsidiaries, which are 
engaged in local and geographically close retail markets and also rely on local deposits 
and deposit guarantees (see also Cerutti et al. 2007, Fiechter et al. 2011), have better 
knowledge of the greater region than only wholesale oriented branches or even bank 
holding companies that are situated in Germany. Information and monitoring costs as 
proxied by bilateral gravity-type variables might thus be lower than for branches and 
bank holding companies that do not have this advantage of a better knowledge of the 
local retail market, which in turn is very important for wholesale activity, too. The 
effect of common legal origin is negative for the direct mode and positive for the branch 
or subsidiary mode.  
4.4 What is the Impact of the Banks’ Business Model? 
While Table 6 accounts for differences across the foreign business models of banks, 
Table 7 takes into consideration that the domestic business models differ as well. The 
German banking system is characterized by a three-tier structure consisting of 
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commercial, savings, and cooperative banks. These banks have different business 
models: the private banks are traditionally more active in the wholesale business and on 
international markets, while the savings and cooperative banks focus more on retail 
activities in local markets.  
To check how pooling across the different domestic business models affects our results, 
we split the sample into observations for banks in each of these groups (Table 7). Given 
these different business models and differences in the probability of going abroad, the 
determinants of international activities of banks in these three groups are surprisingly 
similar. One exception is the effect of short-term funding which is associated with lower 
international assets for commercial banks, but with higher international assets for 
savings banks.  
The most interesting difference across the different banking groups is that for the state 
support variable though: commercial banks which have received state support have 
increased rather than decreased their international assets. The negative effect for the 
pooled regressions is driven by the savings banks. This result is interesting as it suggests 
an alternative interpretation of the effect of state support: on the one hand, state support 
was associated with the requirement to divest international activities. On the other hand, 
however, state support has also allowed banks to stabilize their activities and to expand 
their international activities relative to total assets (which we include as a control 
variable). Analyzing whether these international expansions have increased or decreased 
bank risk would be an interesting extension of our study. 
Finally, most results for the financial frictions are similar across the different 
specifications as well. The main exceptions are that the positive effect of adjacency 
found for the full sample is driven to a large extent by the savings banks, reflecting the 
regional nature of their business model. But adjacency is positive for all three banking 
groups and significant at the ten percent level for commercial banks, too. Common legal 
origin, common language, and regional trade agreements play a role only for the 
commercial banks. 
4.5 What Are the Effects of Host Country Characteristics and 
Regulations? 
Table 8 presents the results for augmenting the baseline specification by additional 
(lagged) host-country characteristics. Host country and year fixed effects are now 
included separately because host-year dummies would be collinear with the additional 
variables. We also estimate this specification for samples before and during the crisis. 
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The country-level variables proxying for financial and business freedom enter 
significantly with the expected positive signs. The remaining results are hardly affected. 
Bank-level covariates and proxies for financial frictions are quite robust compared to 
the baseline specification in Table 3, Column 1. The joint significance of all seven 
variables proxying for financial frictions hardly changes. The null hypothesis for those 
variables being jointly zero can be rejected with a χ²(6)-value of 189.02 at the one 
percent significance level, which is almost the exact same value as in the baseline 
model. 
All three macroprudential regulations are jointly significantly different from zero at the 
one percent level. Asset measures are strongly significant whereas asset/liability 
measures and capital measures are not significant. More restrictive asset side measures 
in the form of limits on exposure concentration and caps on foreign currency lending 
lower international bank assets. This is in line with expectations because these measures 
impact a bank’s international assets directly, as opposed to capital and liability 
measures.  
5 Conclusion  
The past decades have witnessed a substantial increase in international banking which 
the recent financial crisis has brought an abrupt end to. International banking has 
declined significantly, and it is not clear whether it will revert to its pre-crisis level in 
the near future. This paper has examined the extent of the decline and its determinants. 
Using a novel bank-level dataset for German bank holding companies and their 
branches and subsidiaries, we have examined their international activity for the period 
2002-2011.  
Stylized facts show that German banks have withdrawn from foreign markets, both 
along the extensive and the intensive margin. This withdrawal has been relatively 
stronger for activities of foreign subsidiaries compared to direct cross-border assets or 
assets held through branches.  
Our results suggest the following interpretation of these trends and their persistence. 
First, banks with market-based funding models and, in particular, with a high share of 
wholesale funding have higher international assets. Hence, persistently tighter 
conditions on funding markets would have an impact on the internationalization 
strategies that banks will pursue in the future. How persistent this adjustment is going to 
be is hard to predict. To the extent that the re-regulation of the banking industry that is 
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currently taking place changes market structures in banking and banks’ funding 
markets, the adjustment is likely to be sustained.  
Second, policy interventions matter. Some banks receiving German state support during 
the crisis have lowered their international assets, and foreign macroprudential policies 
had a negative impact as well. To the extent that reductions in international assets are 
associated with the closure of foreign affiliates, they are likely to be persistent. 
Third, financial frictions matter for international banking. As in previous studies, we 
find that geographical and cultural proximity has a positive impact on banks’ 
international assets. Perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, the impact of financial 
frictions has remained relatively stable throughout the crisis as well. The variables for 
which we find a stronger effect during the crisis period are adjacency and the presence 
of bilateral trade agreements. This suggests that trade-related finance has become 
relatively more important over time. 
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6 Data Appendix  
 
Table 1:  List of Variables and Definitions 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variable   
Log total international 
assets  
(intensive margin) 
Natural  logarithm of gross total 
assets (in million €) held in any 
destination country by any bank 
located in any host country 
External Position Reports, Deutsche Bundesbank 
Bank-level covariates   
Log size  
 
Natural logarithm of banks’ gross 
total assets 
Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, Deutsche 
Bundesbank 
Capitalization Ratio of total equity capital to 
gross total assets 
Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, Deutsche 
Bundesbank 
Wholesale funding  Liabilities vis-à-vis banks 
(including central bank) / total 
liabilities 
Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, Deutsche 
Bundesbank 
Short-term funding  Total short-term liabilities (with 
maturity of up to one year) / total 
liabilities 
Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, Deutsche 
Bundesbank 
State support Dummy variable equal to 1 for 
bank holding companies that 
received state support during the 
crisis, 0 otherwise 
SoFFin (German Restructuring Fund) 
http://www.fmsa.de/de/fmsa/soffin/instrumente/
SoFFin-Massnahmen/SoFFin-Massnahmen.html 
Subsidiary Dummy variable equal to 1 for 
subsidiary activity, 0 otherwise 
External Position Reports, Deutsche Bundesbank 
Branch Dummy variable equal to 1 for 
branch activity, 0 otherwise 
External Position Reports, Deutsche Bundesbank 
Bilateral financial 
frictions 
  
Log distance Natural logarithm of the 
population weighted distance (in 
km) between host and destination 
country 
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales, CEPII 
Adjacency Dummy variable equal to 1 if two 
countries share a common border, 
0 otherwise 
CEPII 
Common legal origin 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if two 
countries have the same legal 
origin, 0 otherwise 
CEPII 
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Common language 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if two 
countries share a common 
language that is spoken by at least 
9% of the population in both 
countries, 0 otherwise 
CEPII 
Regional trade agreement Dummy variable equal to 1 if two 
countries are both members of a 
regional trade agreement, 0 
otherwise 
CEPII 
Common currency (Euro) 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if two 
countries share the Euro as same 
currency, 0 otherwise 
 
Bilateral trade Total yearly bilateral trade flows 
in thousands of euros, total trade 
in goods (grand total) 
OECD, STAN Bilateral Trade Database 
Unilateral financial 
frictions 
  
Business freedom Index from 0 (repressive) – 100 
(completely free business 
environment)  
“measure of the ability to start, 
operate, and close a business that 
represents the overall burden of 
regulation as well as the efficiency 
of government in the regulatory 
process.” 
Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage 
Foundation 
Financial freedom Index from 0 (repressive) – 100 
(negligible government 
interference)  
“measure of banking efficiency as 
well as a measure of independence 
from government control and 
interference in the financial 
sector.” 
Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage 
Foundation 
GDP per capita 
 
In thousands of euros  World Governance Indicators, World Bank 
Asset measures Index of macroprudential 
regulations running from 0 to 5 
capturing whether caps on loan-
to-value ratios, caps on debt/loan-
to-income ratios, limits on 
exposure concentration, caps on 
foreign currency lending, and 
ceilings on credit or credit growth 
have been in place for a given 
year. The index is the sum of 
individual dummy variables for 
the specific asset measures being 
in place (=1) or not (=0). 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Survey of 
Central Banks 
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Asset/liability measures  Index of macroprudential 
regulations running from 0 to 3 
capturing whether limits on net 
open currency positions, limits on 
maturity mismatch, and reserve 
requirements have been in place 
for a given year. The index is the 
sum of individual dummy 
variables for the specific 
asset/liability measures being in 
place (=1) or not (=0). 
IMF 
Capital measures  Index of macroprudential 
regulations running from 0 to 3 
capturing whether countercyclical 
capital requirement, dynamic 
provisioning, and restrictions on 
profit distribution have been in 
place for a given year. The index 
is the sum of individual dummy 
variables for the specific capital 
measures being in place (=1) or 
not (=0). 
IMF 
Other country level 
covariates 
  
Host is destination Dummy variable equal to 1 if host 
country is destination country, 0 
otherwise 
 
Host (destination) is 
financial center 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if host 
(destination) country is a financial 
center, 0 otherwise 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
Financial crisis dummies   
August 2007 Equal to 1 after (and including 
2007), 0 before 
 
September 2008 Equal to 1 after (and including 
2008), 0 before 
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7 Regression Tables 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics  
An asterisk (*) indicates that minima and maxima for these variables cannot be disclosed due to 
confidentiality reasons. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
Log total international assets 59,701 1.39 3.96 * * 
Bank level covariates      
Log size  59,701 11.27 1.58 * * 
Capitalization 59,701 4.29 2.05 * * 
Wholesale funding 59,701 42.12 20.37 * * 
Short-term funding  59,701 63.17 22.49 * * 
State support (0/1) 59,701 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Savings bank (0/1) 59,701 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Cooperative bank (0/1) 59,701 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Subsidiary activity(0/1) 59,701 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Branch activity (0/1) 59,701 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Bilateral financial frictions      
Log distance 59,701 7.71 1.30 2.13 9.88 
Adjacency (0/1) 59,701 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Common legal origin (0/1) 59,701 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Common language (0/1) 59,701 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Regional trade agreement (0/1) 59,701 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Common currency (Euro) (0/1) 59,701 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Log bilateral trade 49,716 8.97 2.25 -0.61 21.07
Unilateral financial frictions (host country)     
Financial freedom  45,691 63.13 14.65 10 90 
Business freedom 45,691 84.04 10.21 40 100 
GDP per capita  45,691 24.67 6.98 9 92 
Asset measures  45,691 0.17 0.48 0 5 
Asset/liability measures  45,691 0.06 0.27 0 3 
Capital Measures  45,691 0.02 0.15 0 3 
Other country level covariates      
Host is destination (0/1) 59,701 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Host is financial center (0/1) 59,701 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Destination is financial center 
(0/1) 59,701 0.17 0.38 
0 1 
Financial crisis dummies      
August 2007 (0/1) 59,701 0.55 0.50 0 1 
September 2008 (0/1) 59,701 0.44 0.50 0 1 
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Table 3:  Baseline Fixed Effects Regressions  
This table presents results from regressions with bank holding company fixed effects using the full sample, i.e. 
pooling across the three different modes of international banking. The dependent variable is the log of banks’ total 
international assets held in different destination countries by the domestic headquarters, their foreign branches, or 
their foreign subsidiaries located in different host countries. Standard errors are in parentheses. All bank-level 
covariates are lagged by one year. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
Excluding 
country-specific 
regressors 
Excluding bank-
specific 
regressors 
Separate 
country- and 
years dummies 
Including 
bilateral trade 
Log size (t-1) 0.662*** 0.661***  0.663*** 0.496*** 
 (0.094) (0.094)  (0.091) (0.106) 
Capitalization (t-1) 0.003 0.003  0.009 -0.019 
 (0.013) (0.013)  (0.012) (0.014) 
Wholesale funding (t-1) 0.010*** 0.010***  0.007*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Short-term funding (t-1) -0.002 -0.001  0.000 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
State support (0/1) -0.130*** -0.130***  -0.370*** -0.122** 
 (0.050) (0.050)  (0.056) (0.053) 
Subsidiary activity (0/1) -8.252*** -8.610***  -6.831*** -9.611*** 
 (2.810) (2.827)  (0.590) (3.238) 
Branch activity (0/1) -7.448*** -7.836***  -6.052*** -8.982*** 
 (2.804) (2.823)  (0.559) (3.235) 
Log distance -0.554***  -0.549*** -0.619*** -0.695*** 
 (0.156)  (0.160) (0.142) (0.169) 
Adjacency (0/1) 0.666***  0.685*** 0.644*** 0.326 
 (0.241)  (0.241) (0.239) (0.247) 
Common legal origin (0/1) 0.200  0.191 0.197 0.170 
 (0.127)  (0.127) (0.124) (0.142) 
Common language (0/1) 0.461**  0.459** 0.440** 0.252 
 (0.216)  (0.216) (0.216) (0.209) 
Regional trade agreement  0.546**  0.525** 0.267 0.223 
(0/1) (0.240)  (0.239) (0.178) (0.245) 
Common currency (Euro)  0.255  0.267 0.313** 0.073 
(0/1) (0.207)  (0.209) (0.148) (0.196) 
Log bilateral trade     0.137* 
     (0.070) 
Host is destination (0/1) 2.877*** 4.480*** 2.898*** 2.750*** 2.062*** 
 (0.470) (0.422) (0.474) (0.476) (0.541) 
Host is financial center (0/1) 5.120* 5.083* 0.912 4.182*** 6.767** 
 (2.823) (2.845) (0.575) (0.600) (3.250) 
Destination is financial center  1.939*** 2.105*** 1.895*** 1.397*** 2.275*** 
(0/1) (0.365) (0.491) (0.363) (0.385) (0.453) 
Country-year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  
Country fixed effects No  No  No  Yes  No 
Year fixed effects No  No  No  Yes  No 
Number of observations 59,701 59,701 59,701 59,701 49,716 
Number of panel units 11,159 11,159 11,159 11,159 9,318 
R² within 0.071 0.070 0.065 0.018 0.065 
R² between 0.514 0.486 0.509 0.509 0.522 
R² overall 0.500 0.474 0.498 0.491 0.494 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
Table 4: Regressions with Crisis Dummies and Crisis Interaction Terms  
This table presents results from regressions with bank holding company fixed effects using the full sample, i.e. 
pooling across the three different modes of international banking. The dependent variable is the log of banks’ total 
international assets held in different destination countries by the domestic headquarters, their foreign branches, or 
their foreign subsidiaries located in different host countries. The second columns of regressions (2) and (4) display 
the coefficients for the interaction terms of the variables with the crisis dummy. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
All bank-level covariates are lagged by one year. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. * Significant 
at 10% level. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Baseline with 
crisis dummy 
(August 2007)
Baseline with crisis 
dummy (August 2007) 
and crisis interaction 
terms 
Baseline with 
crisis dummy 
(September 
2008) 
Baseline with crisis dummy 
(September 2008) and 
crisis interaction terms 
  Baseline Interaction term  Baseline 
Interaction 
term 
Log size (t-1) 0.662*** 0.653*** 0.018 0.662*** 0.663*** 0.011 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.021) (0.094) (0.098) (0.022) 
Capitalization (t-1) 0.003 0.004 -0.014 0.003 0.009 -0.018 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Wholesale funding (t-1)  0.010*** 0.010*** -0.000 0.010*** 0.011*** -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Short-term funding (t-1) -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
State support (0/1) -0.130*** -0.172***  -0.130*** -0.152***  
 (0.050) (0.050)  (0.050) (0.054)  
Subsidiary activity (0/1) -8.252*** -6.340*** -2.157 -8.252*** -7.211*** -1.221 
 (2.810) (0.621) (2.633) (2.810) (0.572) (2.599) 
Branch activity (0/1) -7.448*** -5.874*** -1.514 -7.448*** -6.627*** -0.719 
 (2.804) (0.584) (2.630) (2.804) (0.533) (2.595) 
Log distance -0.554*** -0.510*** -0.083 -0.554*** -0.519*** -0.076 
 (0.156) (0.159) (0.059) (0.156) (0.160) (0.059) 
Adjacency (0/1) 0.666*** 0.590** 0.140 0.666*** 0.565** 0.229** 
 (0.241) (0.239) (0.106) (0.241) (0.241) (0.111) 
Common legal origin (0/1) 0.200 0.123 0.124 0.200 0.143 0.101 
 (0.127) (0.135) (0.084) (0.127) (0.133) (0.078) 
Common language (0/1) 0.461** 0.584*** -0.203* 0.461** 0.577*** -0.225** 
 (0.216) (0.225) (0.114) (0.216) (0.223) (0.110) 
Regional trade agreement  0.546** 0.457* 0.128 0.546** 0.475* 0.126 
(0/1) (0.240) (0.246) (0.158) (0.240) (0.249) (0.145) 
Common currency (Euro)  0.255 0.229 0.082 0.255 0.281 0.010 
(0/1) (0.207) (0.212) (0.129) (0.207) (0.209) (0.133) 
Host is destination (0/1) 2.877*** 3.038*** -0.302* 2.877*** 3.008*** -0.294 
 (0.470) (0.473) (0.180) (0.470) (0.477) (0.185) 
Host is financial center (0/1) 5.120* 3.877*** 1.270 5.120* 4.500*** 0.642 
 (2.823) (0.632) (2.641) (2.823) (0.584) (2.602) 
Destination is financial center  1.939*** 1.437*** 0.515** 1.939*** 1.662*** 0.297 
(0/1) (0.365) (0.376) (0.232) (0.365) (0.364) (0.224) 
Crisis dummy (0/1) -1.750 0.462  -1.034 0.405  
 (2.615) (0.685)  (2.578) (0.685)  
Country-year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects No  No  No  No  
Year fixed effects No  No  No  No  
No. of observations 59,701 59,701 59,701 59,701 
Number of panel units 11,159 11,159 11,159 11,159 
R² within 0.071 0.074 0.071 0.073 
R² between 0.514 0.516 0.514 0.515 
R² overall 0.500 0.501 0.500 0.501 
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Table 5: Sample Splits Pre-Crisis versus Crisis Sample  
This table presents results from regressions with bank holding company fixed effects using the full sample, i.e. 
pooling across the three different modes of international banking. The dependent variable is the log of banks’ total 
international assets held in different destination countries through the domestic headquarters, its foreign branches, or 
its foreign subsidiaries located in different host countries. The samples are split as indicated in the top of the columns. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. All bank-level covariates are lagged by one year. ***Significant at 1% level. 
**Significant at 5% level. *Significant at 10% level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Before 2007 After 2007 Before 2008 After 2008 
Log size (t-1) 0.163 0.851*** 0.547*** 0.838*** 
 (0.151) (0.100) (0.131) (0.107) 
Capitalization (t-1) -0.027* 0.046*** -0.033** 0.052*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Wholesale funding (t-1) 0.001 0.007*** 0.005** 0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Short-term funding (t-1) 0.003 -0.003** 0.003 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
State support (0/1) 0.000 -0.137*** 0.095 -0.268*** 
 (0.000) (0.044) (0.155) (0.092) 
Subsidiary activity (0/1) 1.024 -8.083*** 0.000 -7.507** 
 (2.362) (2.939) (0.000) (3.144) 
Branch activity (0/1) 1.331 -6.853** 0.429** -6.276** 
 (2.343) (2.932) (0.172) (3.136) 
Log distance -0.528*** -0.549*** -0.521*** -0.555*** 
 (0.171) (0.161) (0.169) (0.160) 
Adjacency (0/1) 0.439* 0.778*** 0.432* 0.913*** 
 (0.239) (0.253) (0.238) (0.256) 
Common legal origin (0/1) 0.135 0.221* 0.158 0.211 
 (0.152) (0.134) (0.147) (0.136) 
Common language (0/1) 0.589** 0.375* 0.571** 0.327 
 (0.248) (0.215) (0.243) (0.222) 
Regional trade agreement (0/1) 0.434* 0.869*** 0.428* 0.826** 
 (0.249) (0.329) (0.242) (0.329) 
Common currency (Euro) (0/1) 0.269 0.407* 0.306 0.460** 
 (0.229) (0.216) (0.217) (0.232) 
Host is destination (0/1) 3.066*** 2.602*** 3.082*** 2.596*** 
 (0.536) (0.483) (0.527) (0.485) 
Host is financial center (0/1) -2.266** 4.718 -2.794*** 4.238 
 (0.931) (2.950) (0.828) (3.153) 
Destination is financial center  1.994*** 1.965*** 1.296*** 1.936*** 
(0/1) (0.507) (0.380) (0.449) (0.381) 
Country-year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects No  No  No  No  
Year fixed effects No  No  No  No  
No. of observations 26,933 32,768 33,693 26,008 
Number of panel units 8,607 9,571 9,012 9,034 
R² within 0.056 0.066 0.062 0.063 
R² between 0.544 0.516 0.550 0.499 
R² overall 0.515 0.505 0.518 0.498 
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Table 6:  Regressions by Mode of Foreign Activity  
This table presents results from regressions with bank holding company fixed effects using sample splits according to 
the three different modes of international banking (direct, branch, subsidiary). The dependent variable is the log of 
banks’ total international assets held in different destination countries by the domestic headquarters, their foreign 
branches, or their foreign subsidiaries located in different host countries, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. All bank-level covariates are lagged by one year. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Mode Subsidiary Mode Branch Mode 
Log size (t-1) 0.875*** -0.277 -0.101 
 (0.107) (0.207) (0.205) 
Capitalization (t-1) 0.012 0.039* -0.125*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.032) 
Wholesale funding (t-1) 0.007*** 0.011** 0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Short-term funding (t-1) 0.003* -0.018*** -0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
State support (0/1) -0.075 -0.440*** 0.033 
 (0.074) (0.095) (0.100) 
Log distance -1.195*** -0.345** -0.486*** 
 (0.135) (0.172) (0.136) 
Adjacency (0/1) 0.132 0.145 -0.025 
 (0.379) (0.251) (0.269) 
Common legal origin (0/1) -1.366*** 0.410*** 0.666*** 
 (0.031) (0.155) (0.150) 
Common language (0/1) 0.679*** 0.261 0.608*** 
 (0.022) (0.223) (0.234) 
Regional trade agreement (0/1) 0.682*** 0.422 0.464* 
 (0.022) (0.287) (0.237) 
Common currency (Euro) (0/1) -1.132*** -0.018 -0.673*** 
 (0.050) (0.260) (0.252) 
Host is destination (0/1)  3.342*** 3.088*** 
  (0.606) (0.434) 
Host is financial center (0/1)  2.942*** 5.105* 
  (0.752) (3.014) 
Destination is financial center (0/1) 1.892*** -1.603*** 3.004*** 
 (0.012) (0.559) (1.134) 
Country-year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects No  No  No  
Year fixed effects No  No  No  
Number of observations 28,691 14,219 16,791 
Number of panel units 4,218 3,359 3,582 
R² within 0.104 0.102 0.092 
R² between 0.760 0.488 0.470 
R² overall 0.689 0.466 0.448 
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Table 7: Regressions by Bank-Group  
This table presents results from regressions with bank holding company fixed effects using sample splits according to 
the type of the bank (commercial, savings (including Landesbanken), cooperative). The dependent variable is the log 
of banks’ total international assets held in different destination countries by the domestic headquarters, their foreign 
branches, or their foreign subsidiaries located in different host countries. Standard errors are in parentheses. All bank-
level covariates are lagged by one year. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% 
level. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Commercial Banks Savings Banks Cooperative Banks 
Log size (t-1) 0.713*** 0.090 1.447*** 
 (0.114) (0.212) (0.415) 
Capitalization (t-1) -0.005 -0.067* -0.067 
 (0.014) (0.035) (0.127) 
Wholesale funding (t-1) 0.011*** 0.003 0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Short-term funding (t-1) -0.007*** 0.013*** 0.011* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
State support (0/1) 0.221*** -0.233*** 0.000 
 (0.077) (0.082) (0.000) 
Subsidiary activity (0/1) -8.143*** -5.515*** 1.269 
 (2.846) (1.012) (5.018) 
Branch activity (0/1) -7.402*** -5.106*** 2.961 
 (2.840) (0.970) (4.838) 
Log distance -0.472*** -0.678*** -1.101*** 
 (0.137) (0.193) (0.305) 
Adjacency (0/1) 0.464* 0.709*** 0.537 
 (0.244) (0.265) (0.436) 
Common legal origin (0/1) 0.249* 0.161 -0.219 
 (0.135) (0.176) (0.301) 
Common language (0/1) 0.537*** 0.356 0.585 
 (0.206) (0.290) (0.451) 
Regional trade agreement (0/1) 0.700*** 0.341 -0.806 
 (0.214) (0.336) (0.798) 
Common currency (Euro) (0/1) 0.107 0.129 1.002** 
 (0.233) (0.243) (0.427) 
Host is destination (0/1) 3.454*** 1.928*** -0.261 
 (0.399) (0.741) (1.512) 
Host is financial center (0/1) 4.540 3.326*** -4.741 
 (2.860) (1.039) (4.974) 
Destination is financial center (0/1) 2.440*** 1.606*** 0.028 
 (0.608) (0.480) (0.823) 
Country-year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects No  No  No  
Year fixed effects No  No  No  
Number of observations 27,908 24,900 6,893 
Number of panel units 5,800 4,319 1,066 
R² within 0.088 0.106 0.229 
R² between 0.436 0.626 0.740 
R² overall 0.440 0.585 0.682 
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Table 8: Regressions with Host Country Characteristics and Banking Regulation  
This table presents results from regressions with bank holding company fixed effects using the full sample, i.e. 
pooling across the three different modes of international banking. The dependent variable is the log of banks’ total 
international assets held in different destination countries through the domestic headquarters, its foreign branches, or 
its foreign subsidiaries located in different host countries. Standard errors are in parentheses. All bank-level as well as 
the host country level covariates are lagged by one year. ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. 
*Significant at 10% level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Baseline 
Baseline with 
regulatory 
measures 
Before 2007 After 2007 Before 2008 After 2008 
Log size (t-1) 0.609*** 0.603*** 0.305* 0.136 0.731*** 0.062 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.158) (0.146) (0.130) (0.165) 
Capitalization (t-1) -0.018 -0.015 -0.008 -0.075*** -0.016 -0.070*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) 
Wholesale funding (t-1) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.005** 0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Short-term funding (t-1) 0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.006*** 0.004 -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
State support (0/1) -0.253*** -0.233*** 0.000 -0.138*** -0.126 -0.107 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.000) (0.045) (0.227) (0.088) 
Subsidiary activity (0/1) -6.142*** -6.172*** -8.176*** -9.190*** -6.137*** -10.144*** 
 (0.892) (0.931) (1.272) (1.044) (1.109) (1.327) 
Branch activity (0/1) -5.175*** -5.206*** -7.659*** -7.576*** -5.475*** -8.478*** 
 (0.873) (0.904) (1.257) (1.022) (1.088) (1.310) 
Log distance -0.587*** -0.587*** -0.606*** -0.593*** -0.603*** -0.615*** 
 (0.202) (0.202) (0.212) (0.218) (0.208) (0.223) 
Adjacency (0/1) 0.370 0.371 0.273 0.401 0.230 0.535** 
 (0.246) (0.246) (0.242) (0.262) (0.240) (0.269) 
Common legal origin (0/1) 0.301* 0.303* 0.286 0.321* 0.266 0.330* 
 (0.168) (0.168) (0.191) (0.177) (0.183) (0.186) 
Common language (0/1) 0.527** 0.528** 0.569** 0.516** 0.610** 0.413 
 (0.252) (0.252) (0.270) (0.256) (0.264) (0.270) 
Regional trade agreement  0.482* 0.486** 0.326 0.863** 0.306 0.862** 
(0/1) (0.247) (0.248) (0.255) (0.375) (0.244) (0.385) 
Common currency (Euro)  0.241 0.233 0.293 0.282 0.339 0.293 
(0/1) (0.201) (0.202) (0.238) (0.212) (0.224) (0.239) 
Financial freedom (t-1) 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.003 0.006 0.008** 0.015* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) 
Business freedom (t-1) 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.002 -0.019* 0.008** 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.014) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.079*** 0.083*** -0.031 0.035 0.063 -0.072 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.043) (0.041) (0.040) (0.049) 
Host is destination (0/1) 3.133*** 3.131*** 3.142*** 3.068*** 3.234*** 2.972*** 
 (0.497) (0.496) (0.560) (0.528) (0.541) (0.536) 
Host is financial center  2.074** 2.134** 4.986*** 4.916*** 2.218* 6.444*** 
(0/1) (0.984) (0.988) (1.396) (1.244) (1.223) (1.491) 
Destination is financial  1.872*** 1.899*** -0.079 1.934*** -0.092 1.995*** 
center (0/1) (0.353) (0.346) (0.470) (0.386) (0.461) (0.400) 
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Asset measures (0-5)  -0.147** -0.033 -0.134** 0.088 -0.066 
  (0.063) (0.227) (0.054) (0.178) (0.048) 
Asset/liability measures   0.049 0.118 0.158 -0.027 -0.007 
(0-3)  (0.111) (0.293) (0.109) (0.192) (0.149) 
Capital measures (0-3)  -0.110 0.038 0.200 -0.433 -0.018 
  (0.181) (0.079) (0.184) (0.630) (0.206) 
Country-year fixed effects Destination  Destination  Destination  Destination Destination  Destination  
Country fixed effects Host  Host  Host  Host  Host  Host  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of observations 45,691 45,691 23,203 22,488 29,030 16,661 
Number of panel units 8,694 8,694 7,371 7,312 7,712 6,796 
R² within 0.056 0.056 0.047 0.040 0.051 0.039 
R² between 0.544 0.544 0.555 0.550 0.561 0.535 
R² overall 0.522 0.522 0.526 0.535 0.530 0.532 
 
